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Adaptive authentication allows a system to dynamically se-
lect the best mechanism for authenticating a user depend-
ing on contextual factors, such as location, proximity to de-
vices, and other attributes. Current systems in the literature
are built to demonstrate feasibility and basic usability im-
provements in specific scenarios, but none of them follows a
methodological approach for system design, neglecting the
huge body of research on adaptation. In this position pa-
per, we posit the necessity to apply such a structured mod-
elling procedure and show its potential benefits to achieve
better and more usable designs. We discuss the modelling
steps to be followed, identify key challenges to be addressed,
and present an initial reference architecture for adaptive dis-
tributed authentication.
1. INTRODUCTION
Usable authentication research has been dominated by ef-
forts to improve the ease and security of authentication
mechanisms, and, particularly, by the exploration of alterna-
tives to the omnipresent text passwords. We are witnessing
the development of new less intrusive ways of authenticat-
ing users, such as gait recognition, keystroke dynamics, or
even authentication by how the user sings, or thinks [15].
However, since there is no one-size-fits-all in security, no
new mechanism is going to replace all the others and be ac-
cepted as the universal solution. In fact, some mechanisms
are preferred under certain environmental conditions (e.g.,
voice recognition while driving), others are more secure to
access sensitive applications (e.g., multifactor), and some
of them can be only used in devices with the appropriate
sensors and capabilities (e.g., brainwaves or heartbeat bio-
metrics). Thus, a path to take the most of this heterogeneity
and achieve better security and usability is the design of sys-
tems that are able to sense the environment and adapt the
authentication mechanism to the surrounding conditions or
context, as explored in [4, 16, 9, 12, 17, 3, 5].
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We set out to review the significant literature on adaptive
authentication (Section 2) and found it noticeable that cur-
rent proposals have not been designed following the method-
ological principles that are well-known in the adaptive sys-
tems discipline [2, 6]. Instead, since the focus for authen-
tication systems has been put on demonstrating feasibility
rather than design, the so far proposed systems are diffi-
cult to extend or reuse (e.g., to include new authenticators1
, adaptation strategies, contexts), which hinders faster ad-
vance on research. Furthermore, the lack of design analysis
has led to poor formalizations of usability goals. To im-
prove the situation, this paper arguments the importance of
pursuing a methodological approach to design. We describe
the modelling steps that should be followed and discuss how
they can be applied to the authentication domain, charac-
terizing the full problem space (Section 3). As an outcome
of this procedure, we present our work-in-progress towards a
reference architecture for adaptive authentication, identify-
ing key research challenges (Section 4), as well as our main
conclusions after this study (Section 5).
2. ADAPTIVE AUTHENTICATION
SYSTEMS: A BRIEF REVIEW
Description. In the early 2000s there were already initial
proposals on adaptive authentication tied to the appear-
ance of the first ubiquitous computing systems, such as e.g.,
Cerberus for GAIA [1]. However, since efforts were soon
switched to finding alternatives to passwords, it is not until
the beginning of this last decade that research on adaptive
authentication gained traction again. Among the most rel-
evant recent works we find [4, 16, 9, 12, 17, 3, 5], whose
main features are described in the following. The CASA
framework [4] presents a probabilistic model to adapt user-
to-smartphone authentication. Based on three location con-
texts (Home, Work, Other), the locking screen switches among
PIN, password, or no authentication. The adaptation met-
rics are the probabilities that the user is correctly authenti-
cated at a specific place using a specific method, which are
difficult to estimate without wide-scale studies, and hard
to extend to other contexts and authenticators. Similarly,
TreasurePhone [16] adapts authentication based on location
context, but this approach protects access to smartphone ap-
plications with different sensitivities, being more granular.
There is another work closely-related to TreasurePhone [9],
which adapts authentication to applications in a smart-space
scenario. In this solution, adaptation of the authentication
1We use authenticator and authentication mechanism inter-
changeably throughout the paper
mechanism is based on the reliability that the user is po-
sitioned in front of the application, which is communicated
by different user devices pre-registered with the system as
accredited tokens. The three approaches described so far [4,
16, 9] do not incorporate authentication mechanisms other
than traditional password/PIN, and even require the user
to carry additional tokens (e.g., accredited devices, NFC
tags). Nevertheless, there are other recent solutions [12,
17, 3] that introduce more usable authenticators and whose
adaptation techniques are not only based on changes on the
security level inferred by the context, but also include con-
textual factors related to usability. One example of such
an approach is Progressive authentication [12], which con-
tinuously adapts access to smartphone applications based
on multimodal biometric signals and PIN-based authenti-
cation outcomes fed to a classifier. The trust score given
by the classifier is mapped to three sensitivity levels un-
der which applications are categorized, and signals can be
switched off/on depending on the required sensitivity level.
Another example of usable adaptation is [17], which adjusts
the smartphone lock mechanism between voice recognition,
face scan, and fingerprint, depending on which one is more
usable for the current context based on sensed activity, light
level, noise level, etc. The main gap in [17] is the lack of
security-based adaptation, though they mention that this
functionality could be added by reasoning on the FAR (False
Acceptance Rate) and FRR (False Reject Rate) values of the
authenticators. In this sense, [3] does characterize the secu-
rity strength of 15 different authenticators and defines an
algorithm that selects a multifactor authentication mecha-
nism optimized for the security level required by an appli-
cation and for the environmental usability conditions. How-
ever, the selection is limited to multifactor authenticators
and the proposal is centered on the selection algorithm but
does not define how this logic can be included and executed
within an adaptation architecture. In this sense, none of
the above works describe an architecture that decouples all
the adaptation functionalities, capturing both usability and
security features, and facilitating seamless integration of dif-
ferent authenticators, contexts, and adaptation algorithms.
CORMORANT [5] aims at a similar goal, but still does not
capture all the dimensions of an adaptive system.
Position. When reflecting on the design of current adap-
tive authentication systems, we found out that no work so
far has applied a methodological approach, reason for which
they lack completeness and extensibility. In the following,
we show that by applying a systematic modelling approach
grounded in the adaptive systems discipline [2, 6], it is pos-
sible to fully characterize the adaptive authentication prob-
lem space and define a reference architecture for distributed
adaptive authentication that facilitates easy integration of
diverse authenticators. All in all, this will foster research
advance on adaptive authentication as it will permit col-
laboration of different specialized communities, which can
focus on sub-problems that can be contributed as compo-
nents towards the higher goal of adaptive authentication,
e.g., definition of usability and authentication strength met-
rics, design of new implicit authenticators, definition of con-
texts, or adaptation algorithms. Instances of the reference
system would be directly comparable and could be evaluated
under the eyes of both usable security and adaptive systems
experts.
3. SYSTEMMODEL
An adaptive system is composed by a set of managed re-
sources and its adaptation logic, which monitors the envi-
ronment and managed resources (M), analyzes the data for
changes (A), plans adaptation (P), and controls the exe-
cution of the adaptation (E), based on a shared knowledge
repository (K). These activities are known as MAPE-K cy-
cle [6], and they are implemented within a feedback loop in
the adaptation logic. To model what should be done in the
MAPE logic, there are a set of dimensions to consider, de-
rived from the answer to five basic questions: Why, When,
What, Where and How to adapt? [8]. By transferring these
concepts to adaptive authentication, we confront the design
of systems were the managed resources are the devices with
authenticators. Thus, to depict the design possibilities of
the adaptation logic that controls these resources, in the
following, we answer the five adaptation questions by nam-
ing the adaptation dimensions from the taxonomy presented
in [8] that are relevant for adaptive authentication. Figure
1 shows an overview of the resulting adaptation taxonomy
for authentication.
Figure 1: Taxonomy of modelling dimensions and
guiding questions for adaptive systems’ design based
on [8], tailored to the authentication domain. Grey
boxes highlight desirable features in an adaptive au-
thentication system.
3.1 Why to adapt?
In an adaptive system, the reason for adaptation is a change
on one or more system elements: technical resources, en-
vironment, and/or user [6]. First, in the specific case of
authentication, the technical resources are the devices with
different authenticators available for the user, which may be
active or inactive. For example, if the system detects that
there is a user-owned fixed computer in the proximity of
her smartphone, authentication to the latter can be based
on periodic face scans realized by the computer camera, or
through typing dynamics, instead of activating a password
screen or other locking mechanism in the phone. Second,
with regards to the environment, there is a wide range of
factors that may impact authentication selection. On the
one hand, there are factors related to security like the loca-
tion context (which changes the attack surface), authentica-
tion mechanisms’ strength, or application sensitivity levels.
On the other hand, there are environmental conditions that
affect usability, like noise levels for voice recognition, user
activity, or battery level. Third, changes on user authenti-
cation preferences can be considered for better adaptation,
e.g., personal interaction preferences or those related to user
disabilities. Furthermore, when there are various users reg-
istered to the authentication system, adaptation is also trig-
gered when a change on the user is detected. Architecturally,
when designing for this dimension, we decide what should
be monitored, i.e., the security and usability values of the
authenticators, as well as all the factors influencing them.
These data determine the input to the selection algorithms,
which should be designed at this point to optimize both secu-
rity and usability. In this sense, the continuous or discrete
nature of the different authenticators has design implica-
tions. Therefore, when the pool of managed resources in-
cludes continuous authenticators [10], algorithms can be de-
fined to maintain the user authenticated during a session and
only re-authenticate when changes make necessary to raise
the level of authentication. On the contrary, if we only man-
age one-time authenticators (e.g., password, fingerprint), al-
gorithms cannot maintain a continuously authenticated ses-
sion. Here it is interesting to compare security/usability
trade-offs considering the time to detect a malicious user and
performance costs in the continuous case, versus the lower
consumption of one-time authenticators but their inability
to detect a change on the user. Finally, the adaptation rea-
son must be in line with user-defined or organization-defined
authentication requirements. For example, a company im-
plementing an adaptive authentication system may require
all the authentications happening in common rooms to be
hardened with respect to authentication events in personal
offices.
3.2 When to adapt?
Reasoning for adaptation can be triggered reactively or proac-
tively. Reactive reasoning triggers an adaptation after an
event, whereas proactive reasoning prepares adaptation or
adapts the system if the adaptation logic anticipates events
that would trigger adaptation [6]. In the scope of authen-
tication, reactiveness means that the selected authentica-
tion mechanism is chosen when the user tries to access an
application or device. In the proactive case, we have, e.g.,
systems that automatically change the authentication mech-
anism for device lock/unlock when the location of the user
is considered more secure. In this latter situation, though
there is no need to adapt until the user wants to access the
device, the selected mechanism is anticipated and ready for
the time of authentication, which makes the process faster
and more seamless. Architecturally, this distinction between
reactive and proactive adaptation has an impact on how to
design algorithms for analysing the monitored data. Re-
active approaches just need to continuously monitor user
access events, at which point additional context informa-
tion is acquired and analysed on-the-fly. In turn, proac-
tive approaches need to continuously monitor and analyse
more data combined with prediction for anticipated pre-
selection. Common examples of these data are: location,
battery level, activity, or environmental conditions like noise
or light, aligned with the usability and security goals estab-
lished in the Why? modelling step. Regarding usability, the
time of adaptation is a central question. Proactive adapta-
tion is preferable because it avoids interruptions in the user’s
workflow. However, time and battery consumption may be
an issue due to the intensive monitoring and analysis and
the associated frequent changes of authenticators. Ideally,
the system could predict the intention of the user to authen-
ticate and change the mechanism only in that case, but the
complexity of prediction algorithms of that kind would pre-
sumably increase. Thus, important questions that need to
be explored when designing and testing for usability regard-
ing the time dimension are: Would a proactive approach be
perceived as more or less usable? Would the time and bat-
tery consumption be unacceptable for user adoption? Would
such automatic inferences lead to the system appearing more
trustworthy or the contrary? Would a reactive approach
imply unacceptable delays for users in the authentication
process? How would these approaches affect the design of
consistent authentication “ceremonies”? Could we use hy-
brid approaches for better trade-offs between seamlessness-
performance?
3.3 Where to adapt?
A system might be adapted on several levels, e.g., applica-
tion, operation system, or communication (middleware) [6].
The adaptation logic must be aware of the relevant levels for
a specific system. In the authentication domain, applicable
levels are system and application. System-level adaptation
implies that the selected authenticator gives access to the
whole system, while application-level adaptation means that
a different authenticator is selected for each application. Ar-
chitecture solutions covering the application level are desir-
able because they provide room for more granular security
in the adaptation strategies. That is, when adapting for
a whole system, the strength of the selected authenticator
must fit the highest level of sensitivity of all the applica-
tions in the system, and so its usability might be worse than
that of lower strength authenticators required for most ap-
plications. The counterpart of application-level adaptation
is the need for configuration of adequate policies mapping
sensitivity to authentication levels. In this regard, an impor-
tant usability question is: How can policies be configured in
a user-friendly way?
3.4 What to adapt?
It is not sufficient to only identify the levels where the adap-
tation should take place. Additionally, the specific adapta-
tion actions that should be carried out on those levels need to
be also identified, i.e., the adaptation technique. Techniques
can be either parametric, which modify system behavior by
adjusting system parameters; or structural, which subsume
changes in the structure of the technical system, i.e., an ex-
change of components, a new composition of components,
or the removal/addition of components [6]. In the authenti-
cation domain, both techniques are applicable. On the one
hand, parametric adaptation can be used to adjust an inner
element of a specific authenticator, such e.g., the number of
features in face recognition, or the use of feature-level, score
level or fusion-level algorithms in multi-modal authentica-
tion [13]. Examples of this kind of parametric adaptation
are the work in [11], an approach that improves accuracy of
smartphone gait-based authentication by changing the pa-
rameter “user template” depending on device placement; or
the multimodal authenticator implemented in Progressive
Authentication [12], which can switch on/off the different
signal parameters, - such as face, voice, or placement. - fed
to a classifier. On the other hand, structural adaptation can
be used to activate or deactivate an authentication mecha-
nism. A flexible adaptive authentication architecture should
provide components for achieving both techniques. Further-
more, parameters should be mapped to usability and secu-
rity values, so they can be converted in actionable elements
to be orchestrated by the adaptation logic.
3.5 How to adapt?
The last modelling dimension refers to the adaptation con-
trol, for which the literature on adaptive systems describes
three different aspects, namely approach, criteria, and de-
gree of centralization [6]. The logic can thus follow an inter-
nal approach, which intertwines the adaptation logic with
the system resources; or an external approach, which splits
the system into adaptation logic and managed resources, in-
creasing maintainability through modularization. With re-
gards to criteria, the logic can be based on models, goals,
rules/policies, utility functions, or combinations of different
criteria. The adaptation possibilities must be analyzed with
the help of the criteria and the best one must be chosen. An-
other aspect of the adaptation logic is the degree of decen-
tralization, hence, the distribution of the MAPE-K compo-
nents which can lead to centralized, decentralized, or hybrid
adaptation logics. When architecting for the adaptive au-
thentication domain, external approaches are preferred for
flexibility. All the different criteria could be applicable and
their performance should be evaluated to find out which al-
ternative offers the best solution. Hence, the approach must
offer flexibility regarding analysis and planning, i.e., the used
algorithms need to be exchangeable. Finally, centralization
is desirable for controlling the swarm of user devices in a
cohesive way, allowing cooperation towards authentication
with low communication overheads compared to decentral-
ized approaches. An additional usability aspect to consider
here is who is the owner/administrator of the system. If an
adaptive authentication system protects user devices and
applications, then all the management tasks fall into the
hands of users. If the system is run by a company and pro-
tects access to its services, the organization would oversee
the management but this comes with privacy issues related
to the collection of user information for implicit authenti-
cation: How should the user be notified? Would the user
be eager to adopt such a system despite the collection of
personal data? How complex would be the registration pro-
cedures?
4. A REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE
Here we outline the architecture (Figure 2) for an adaptive
authentication system. The Adaptation Logic (AL) is im-
plemented in a centralized fashion, which might be available
as Cloud service for devices. The AL integrates a MAPE-K
loop according to the presented system model: The Mon-
itor component includes three modules to register context,
user, and authenticator related changes. The monitoring
functionality is distributed, with sensors implemented in the
Managed Resources and orchestrated by the AL. Further-
more, an Authenticator Registry database is dynamically
updated in the Knowledge component with the available au-
thentication mechanisms and their metadata (usability fea-
tures, security features, and communication endpoints for
adaptation). All these data are fed to the Analyzer module
in the Analysis component, which searches for adaptation
events and notifies the Plan component. The Plan com-
ponent can be seen as the adaptation brain, whose logic is
defined in the Authenticator Selector module, which imple-
ments the selection logic to determine which of the available
authenticators is optimal for the sensed conditions. Dif-
ferent algorithms can be implemented as plugins built on
Rules/Policies, Models, Utilities, or Goals.
Figure 2: Reference architecture for adaptive au-
thentication.
Decisions made in the Plan component are moved to the
Execute component to be translated into actions. The exe-
cution of adaptations is distributed: the Execution Engine
communicates with the Effectors located in the Managed
Resources, indicating which parameters should be changed
for adaptation, or activating/deactivating a complete au-
thenticator. The Effectors perform these modifications in
the associated Managed Resource. Starting from this high-
level architecture, we aim at defining standard interfaces
and input formats for the different modules. With such a
generic definition, elimination, addition, or exchange of el-
ements would be straightforward. To achieve this purpose,
we have elicited as key research challenges:
[RC-1] Authenticator Abstraction. It is required to define an
abstraction that provides standardized means to discover or
detect the presence of an authenticator, read its features
and access its functionalities: activate/deactivate or adjust
behavior through parameters. Effectors and Sensors will be
built on platform-specific APIs implementing this abstrac-
tion. This definition requires investigating which features
are relevant for analyzing adaptation events and for authen-
ticator selection. In this sense, minimum required features
are usability and security strength values for different con-
texts, which leads to RC-2.
[RC-2] Authenticator Metrics. It is required to investigate
which metrics are adequate to describe strength and us-
ability for authenticators of different types (continuous/one-
time, biometric/token/knowledge-based, probabilistic/deter-
ministic, etc.), and how to characterize them to be accessi-
ble in a standardized way. Existing strength metrics are,
e.g., the NIST Levels of Assurance, or FAR/FRR rates for
biometrics. For usability, there are ongoing proposals to
standardize metrics like e.g., the SUS metric [14]. Further-
more, the relation of metrics to context should be modelled,
i.e., the description of functions or rules that reflect the in-
crease/decrease of usability and security values with respect
to contextual factors. This leads to RC-3.
[RC-3] Context Modelling. It is required to investigate which
contextual factors impact the usability of an authenticator
and which other contextual factors impact security. Further-
more, we need to define standardized means for context rep-
resentation, activation, and deactivation, to make context
available to programmers of authentication mechanisms.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the modelling dimensions for adaptive
authentication systems and presented a reference architec-
ture that we believe could be the basis for faster collabo-
rative research. We plan to address the identified research
challenges by completing the architecture design and imple-
menting a proof-of-concept prototype. For the implementa-
tion, the FESAS [7] framework developed in the adaptive
systems community, is a suitable candidate for implement-
ing the adaptation logic as it offers a set of reusable process
elements and system components that will make practical re-
alization easier. Additionally, FESAS focuses on simplifying
the reusability and exchange of algorithms in the adaptation
logic which enables tailoring of adaptive authentication to
an application’s requirements, e.g., by supporting different
adaptation metrics (cf. Section 3.5). The prototype will
demonstrate the designed abstractions, including a basic set
of diverse authenticators, selection algorithms and plugins.
Based on it, we aim at incrementally testing and comparing
different adaptive authentication configurations.
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